Is margin lending marginal? by Peter Fortune
Regional Review Q3 2001 3 illustration by james yang
Is Margin Lending Marginal?
By Peter Fortune § In The Great Crash: 1929, John Kenneth
Galbraith placed margin loans front and center as the reason
for the depth of the market plunge that preceded the Great De-
pression. Indeed, margin loans, now only 1 to 2 percent of the
market value of common stocks, often accounted for more than
10 percent of the New York Stock Exchange’s market value
during the 1920s (some estimates range as high as 20 percent
or more). Such sheer size demanded attention, and the pop-
ular view emerged that the ability to borrow to buy stock—
that is, buying “on margin”—was a source of stock market
instability. In this view, rising stock prices create additional
wealth that can be used as collateral for borrowing and pur-
chasing more stock, thus driving prices up even further. De-
clining prices create “margin calls” in which stockholders must
come up with additional collateral when stock values fall be-
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BUILDING YOUR DREAM HOUSE
thank you for your article “Build-
ing a Home of Your Own” (Q4
2000/Q1 2001). It was accurate, honest,
and informative.
My wife and I built our home be-
tween 1981 and 1987. We did it all: de-
sign, engineering (I am not an engi-
neer), carpentry, electrical, plumbing,
roofing, drywall, etc. We hired help to
put in the septic tank and a bulldozer
to make a foundation hole. I am proud
that during the six-year building
process we passed every inspection.
The only drawback is that we cannot
imagine living anywhere else.
I believe we were successful for a
number of reasons. I was retired so we
were both free to work on the house
full-time. Since we had sufficient funds,
we never had to deal with banks, mort-
gages, etc. I had worked on the design
for ten years and had planned the house
in great detail; the total number of
drawings exceeded 100, including
everything from formal floor plans to
sketches of how a particular detail
would be constructed. I also spent over
$6,000 on codes, trade books, and jour-
nals. Finally, we had no neighbors close
enough to object to construction noise.
Saving money should seldom be the
goal. One should build one’s home be-
cause it will be a challenging, reward-
ing, and creative experience. If our
house disappeared today, we would still
have a treasure trove of memories.
Marvin McConoughey
Corvallis, Oregon
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article “Teens in the Workforce” (Q2
2001). Most research suggests that a
teen’s chance of getting injured on the
job per hour worked is no lower than an
adult’s.
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low the margins required by brokers, leading to widespread liquida-
tion of stocks and further price declines. (For an explanation of the
different margin requirements imposed by the Fed, stock exchanges,
and brokers, see Box, page 6.) 
More recently, low margin requirements in the stock index futures
markets were cited by the Brady Commission and the Securities and
Exchange Commission in their analyses of the October 1987 crash.
And after stock prices fell in the wake of September’s terrorist attacks,
one family of large investors sold $2 billion of Disney stock to pay off
margin loans and “meet liquidity requirements.” In reporting this
incident, The Wall Street Journal voiced concern that further forced
selling of stocks among large investors could “put continued pressure
on an already reeling stock market.”
Despite the popular role given to margin loans in stock market
booms and busts, the Federal Reserve System has changed margin
requirements only 22 times since 1934, the last time in 1974. This has
led some to ask why the Fed has not changed requirements more of-
ten and whether there is a good case for a more active margin policy.
WHY MARGIN REQUIREMENTS?
During the debates that preceded passage of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, several motives for margin requirements emerged. First,
many in Congress believed that an “excessive flow of credit into the
stock market . . . into a vortex of speculation in a few metropolitan
centers” had deprived “legitimate business of the financial aid and
credit” necessary for their operations. Second, margin credit was
thought to expose uninformed or overly optimistic investors to risks
that more informed or prudent people would avoid, and lead to in-
vestor losses and to stress on margin lenders, such as banks and bro-
kers. Said Congressman Sam Rayburn, of Texas, who introduced the
legislation in the House of Representatives, “A reasonably high mar-
gin requirement is essential so that a person cannot get in the market
on a shoestring one day and be one of the sheared lambs when he
wakes up the next morning.” Finally, it was believed that margin loans
contributed to speculative bubbles, which, like the Crash of 1929,
would end with stock price declines made worse by margin calls, an
outcome that would magnify declines in production and employment. 
allocation of credit. The effect of margin loans on the avail-
ability of credit for other business investment is murky and probably
small. The argument that margin loans reduce the credit available for
more legitimate uses implicitly assumes that the economy has a fixed
pool of credit. Alternatively, margin loans that result in the purchase
of stock might stimulate economic activity and add to the pool of sav-
ings and available credit. Or margin loans might simply substitute
for other debt as, for example, when an affluent car buyer borrows
against her margin account instead of taking out an auto loan. Final-
ly, for every dollar of stock bought there is a dollar sold; and while
the buyer might take out a margin loan, the seller might lend the pro-
ceeds by, say, depositing the funds in a money market fund which
channels money to the brokers making margin loans. While margin
loans might affect the way credit is allocated across uses in the econ-
omy and relative interest rates might change, there is no reason to
believe that any adverse effects on businesses will be serious. 
investor-broker protection. Investor protection—an im-
portant goal of securities regulation—is a dubious objective of mar-
gin policy. To paraphrase a biblical statement, the imprudent will al-
ways be with us. In a market economy, investors are allowed to make
their own mistakes, and they are expected to take responsibility for
risks taken so long as they have been properly informed. In addition,
investors have a range of ways to manage the risks imposed by mar-
gin debt that were not available in 1929, such as using futures and
exchange-traded options. Of course, these same instruments can be
used by customers to add to leverage even without resorting to mar-
gin debt or facing margin requirements; this limits the effectiveness
of margin requirements as a way of protecting investors.
The evidence that margin lending is really quite small also weak-
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The Federal Reserve has changed its margin requirements
only 22 times since 1934. The last change was in 1974.
LEARNING FROM A CRASH
The 1929 stock market crash was instrumental in the
wave of securities regulation that followed, including
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that gave the
Federal Reserve System the authority to set initial mar-
gin requirements, the minimum equity required at the
time a security is purchased. The Fed adopted
Regulation T, limiting the size of broker-dealer loans to
customers buying common stocks and equity-related
securities (such as convertible bonds). The Fed also
adopted similar regulations for security loans by banks
and other financial institutions (Regulations G and U)
and for lending by foreign institutions to U.S. citizens
living abroad (Regulation X). In addition to the Fed’s ini-
tial margin requirements, brokers have maintenance
margin requirements that set the minimum equity that
must be held at all times; these are typically tailored to
the characteristics of the securities held. Regional Review Q3 2001 5
ens the argument. While undoubtedly some investors’ accounts are
heavily margined, and some brokers (the e-brokers are notable) have
large margin loan positions with customers, the aggregate amount of
margin debt is, and long has been, about 1 to 2 percent of the value of
common stocks listed on the NYSE and the NASDAQ. We might
empathize with heavily margined traders suffering from margin calls
in bad times, but these are instances of individuals in difficulty, not
of systemic problems requiring public policy intervention. 
Broker protection is, arguably, a more appropriate objective if a bro-
ker’s failure can create spillovers and add to the financial system’s in-
stability. However, brokers can protect themselves from customer de-
faults on margin loans by setting high maintenance margins (certainly
no lower than exchange margins and sometimes even above the Fed’s
initial margin), by closely watching individual accounts, and by liq-
uidating securities, without customer approval, well before the cus-
tomer’s equity has disappeared. Even in the less adaptable financial
world of 1929, Galbraith tells us, there was little evidence of signifi-
cant broker failures adding to systemic risk. 
market stability. Recent interest in margin policy arises from
the fear that margin loans might pump up security prices to unsus-
tainable levels, and that any emerging bear market will be more se-
vere because of the initial overvaluation and subsequent margin calls.
If increases in the size of short-run stock price fluctuations reduce
subsequent production and employment, margin policy deserves our
attention. If major crashes—or protracted bear markets—inhibit
spending, an even greater case for margin policy exists. But if the only
effect of margin lending is to increase stock market volatility, with
no consequences for output or employment, our stabilization efforts
should be focused on broader instruments than margin requirements.
But does more margin lending lead to more market volatility? The
prima facie evidence in the chart suggests, surprisingly, that margin
loans and volatility are negatively correlated; that more margin lend-
ing is associated with lessstock market volatility. While the chart only
shows a brief period since 1986, this negative correlation has been ob-
served as far back as the 1930s. 
There are both theoretical and statistical explanations for this in-
verse association. As for theory, margin loans might be a tool for
knowledgeable investors to take positions that stabilize the market.
In bull periods, any tendency for prices to rise above intrinsic value
might motivate the smart money to bet on a decline in stock prices
by selling stock short—borrowing and selling shares of stock, and
then later replacing the borrowed stock by buying it back at the (one
hopes) lower price and pocketing the difference. Short sales will mit-
igate bubbles because, if profitable, they occur when prices are high.
And in bear periods, margin loans might provide liquidity that en-
courages stock purchases to take advantage of expected recovery.
As for statistical reasons, the negative correlation might arise not
from a causal relationship but from the influence of other factors on
both margin loans and volatility. For example, stock price volatility
is known to be lower in bull markets than in bear markets, and mar-
gin loans typically increase in bull periods when expected returns are
high and fall in bear periods when expected returns are low. Thus,
the association we see in the chart might reflect changes in the mar-
ket’s expectation of future returns rather than any causal relationship
between margin debt and volatility. To compound the statistical illu-
sion, margin loans might rise because stock prices are rising, if sub-
stantial short-selling has occurred. The reason is that losses on short
positions induce short-sellers to borrow to maintain the cash collat-
eral required to cover the larger liability.
Most research on the issue focuses on the relationship between
the Fed’s margin requirements and stock market volatility. This lim-
its the studies to the period 1934 through 1974, when an active mar-
gin policy existed. Although there is little recent work on the rela-
tionship between margin loans (as opposed to margin requirements)
and volatility, studies of margin requirements are instructive. The
results are mixed, giving the reader the sense that margin require-
ments are of little value as a tool to stabilize the stock market. Even
those studies that find that margin policy reduces volatility acknowl-
edge that this does not necessarily support an active policy. Margin
requirements might affect volatility but with such a small impact that
they have little practical importance. Or the effect might be confined
to the short run or to “normal” periods, with little effect on periods of
boom or bust. Furthermore, in the popular mind, the reason for an ac-
tive margin policy is the avoidance of major booms and crashes that
might exacerbate the business cycle. But the link between margin
requirements and macroeconomic stability is even weaker than the
fering from margin calls in bad times, but
emic problems requiring intervention  
DO MARGIN LOANS INCREASE
MARKET VOLATILITY?
Although margin loans tend to be negatively correlated
with market volatility (correlation coefficient = -0.4),
the relationship may not be causal.
VIX is a measure of the implied volatility of the return on the Standard & Poor’s 100 stock index, as
measured by the Chicago Board of Options Exchange’s VIX contract. It is a measure of expectations
about the volatility of returns over the next thirty days. That is, VIX = 27 means that the expected
annualized standard deviation of returns over the next thirty days is 27 percent.
sources: Margin loans data from Federal Reserve System; market capitalization data from New York
Stock Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers; market volatility data from Chicago
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link between margin requirements and stock price stability. 
other arguments. Robert Shiller, a prominent financial econ-
omist and professor at Yale, has recently argued that while the evi-
dence supporting margin policy’s direct effects on stock market or
economic stability is slim, a more active margin policy can serve as a
signal to investors about the fragility of stock prices. If the Fed sees
“irrational exuberance,” an increase in margin requirements tells the
markets that the road ahead is bumpy. But such signals, if timed in-
correctly, might create the problem they are intended to avoid; in-
vestors might overreact to the Fed’s signal, converting a mild price de-
cline into a tailspin. Furthermore, the Fed’s margin-setting authority
is a broad weapon that would not necessarily dampen investor en-
thusiasm in specific sectors such as communications and technolo-
gy, sectors where the heat was highest in recent years.
Another argument for the existence of margin requirements (though
not necessarily for an active margin policy) is that they set a uniform
standard for all brokers. In their absence, both initial and maintenance
margins would be set by brokerage houses or stock exchanges. Com-
petitive pressures might induce low initial margins, increasing the
probability of margin calls. Indeed, margin protection might weak-
en as debt-inclined customers shop for more lenient brokers. A stan-
dard that all brokers must meet can reduce the adverse spillovers from
unfettered broker lending. 
ARE MARGIN REQUIREMENTS REALLY MARGINAL?
There is no conclusive answer to this question. Margin debt—and
any form of leverage—helps define the way financial risks are spread
across economic agents and shapes the redistribution of wealth as sur-
prises occur in security markets. These are matters of great impor-
tance to the individuals and businesses affected. Margin policy might
also be important in distributing leverage across markets. An uneven
playing field, with, say, lower margins in futures than in cash markets,
will shift leverage-related activity between them. In doing so, it may
also facilitate evasion of the regulation’s original intent and push risks
into other areas, such as derivative securities. 
But, at the macroeconomic level, margin
lending is, very probably, a nonevent. True, in
a major recession there will be those who de-
fault on margin loans. But that potential ex-
ists for any form of debt, such as home equi-
ty loans and credit card debt, especially since
these can be used as indirect sources of funds
for stock transactions. More important, even
if margin lending contributed to short-run
stock market volatility, there is little indication
that this would translate into changes in over-
all demand. For example, increased short-run
volatility (should it occur) will add to the risk
premium on equities, raising the cost of eq-
uity capital. But the cost of capital in general,
and the cost of equity capital in particular,
have historically had little effect on business
investment spending. So the real issue is not
over whether margin lending affects stock
market volatility, but whether it affects the
severity and timing of the business cycle.
There is no evidence, either way, on this point. 
While Fed pursuit of a more active margin
policy is unwarranted on the basis of current
evidence, the existence of margin require-
ments might still serve an important function.
Margin regulations do establish a higher hur-
dle than would be set by the exchanges or the
brokers. They establish a common standard
across brokers, inhibiting problems that might
result from competitive pressures if require-
ments were solely broker determined. And
they might provide the extra equity cushion
that limits the spillover effects of margin calls
in a deteriorating market. But these are all
benefits that can be achieved without an ac-
tive margin policy. S
HOW TO BUY STOCK ON MARGIN
At the time a stock is purchased, Regulation T requires that the buyer have a mini-
mum equity equal to 50 percent of the amount paid (“Fed margin”); that is, no
more than 50 percent of the purchase can be debt financed. The New York Stock
Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers require that member
firms’ customers maintain a margin of at least 25 percent, called an “exchange mar-
gin.” Most brokers require a higher maintenance margin of about 30 to 35 percent,
the “house margin.” The house margin is tailored to the specific characteristics of
the account.
Consider Elena Yee, who buys $100,000 of stock in ABC Corporation. Regulation
T limits the amount she can borrow to 50 percent, or $50,000. Assuming a 35 per-
cent house margin, Elena’s equity must be at least $35,000, so there is a $15,000
equity cushion at the outset. If ABC’s stock price rises, Elena can use each dollar of
additional equity to buy two dollars of stock. If the stock price falls, her margin
declines to below the initial margin requirement of 50 percent. 
But Regulation T does not require restoration of the initial 50 percent require-
ment; it is silent on the maintenance margin required, leaving that to the discretion
of her broker (who must require margin at least equal to the exchange margin). If,
say, the value of ABC falls to $77,000, Elena’s equity will be $27,000 ($77,000 less
the $50,000 debt), just equal to the assumed house margin of 35 percent of the
value of her ABC stock. Further price declines would result in margin calls by her
broker. Margin calls require either selling stock, with proceeds applied to debt
repayment, or the deposit of additional cash or securities.
Had Elena sold $100,000 of ABC short, Regulation T would require that the
sales proceeds be held as collateral and that she have equity equal to 50 percent of
the value of the short position. In other words, she would need to set aside
$150,000 of assets—the $100,000 cash receipts required as collateral for the
shares borrowed, plus an additional $50,000 in cash or marginable securities. If
ABC’s value rose to, say, $111,111, she would have an unrealized loss of $11,111 and
her equity would fall to $38,889, just equal to the 35 percent house margin. She
would not be required to come up with additional equity unless there were more
price increases. But, because the $100,000 originally held as collateral falls short of
her $111,111 liability, she would have to provide an additional $11,111 to restore her
account to fully collateralized status. These additional funds are typically obtained
by a loan from her broker, adding to the margin debt. In this way, short position
losses give rise to margin loans.